LEC # | TOPICS | READINGS |
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1 | Problems of Justice in a Democratic Society | |
I. Utilitarianism | ||
2 | Hedonistic Utilitarianism | Bentham, Jeremy. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996, chapters 1, 4, 13, and 17 (sec. 1). ISBN: 9780198205166. Study Questions - What is Bentham's "principle of utility" or "greatest happiness principle"? - Bentham says that pleasure is the only thing that is good in itself. Is he right? What about knowledge? Or beauty? Or achieving the aims you set for yourself? - Can you make a utilitarian case against slavery? Consider three cases, and work out the argument for each: (i) slaves are only 10% of the population; (ii) slaves are a quarter of the population, but are members of a socially outcast group; (iii) the slaves are a majority of the population, and do backbreaking work in mines, but are very productive. - Is the legal enforcement of a community's moral code such a bad thing? Does Bentham make a persuasive case against it? (What does he mean when he says it is unprofitable?) Can you think of laws that regulate conduct because the conduct is immoral? What do you think of those laws? |
3 | The Enforcement of Morals | Bowers vs. Hardwick et al., 478 U.S. 186 (1986). (PDF) Lawrence vs. Texas, (2003) (PDF) Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. "Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons." Study Questions - Does the fact that sodomy violates common morality (assuming that it does) provide a legitimate reason for criminalizing it? - What is the distinction between the claim that sodomy violates the common morality in a society, and the claim that it is condemned by the moral views of the majority in society? Does that distinction make a difference? - Utilitarians have traditionally opposed the enforcement of morality. Do they have a convincing utilitarian case against it? - Are there reasons for opposing the enforcement of morality that strike you as more convincing than the utilitarian argument? - If anti-sodomy laws are unacceptable, then what about bans on gay and lesbian marriage? Are they permissible? Is there a case for preserving a ban on gay and lesbian marriage that does not depend on judgments about sexual morality? |
4 | A New Account of the Human Good | Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2002, chapters 1-2. ISBN: 9780872206052. Study Questions - What is Mill's distinction between higher and lower quality pleasures? What does it mean to say that the quality of a pleasure is higher, not just that the quantity is greater? - Is Mill right about the kinds of pleasures that "competent judges" decidedly prefer? Who are these judges, and why should their judgments provide a basis for deciding about the quality of pleasures and the goodness of lives? - Does Mill's higher/lower distinction reflect an objectionable elitism, and an undue emphasis on intellectual pleasures? - Is it better, as Mill says, to be Socrates dissatisfied than the fool satisfied? Why? Is that because Socrates has better pleasures, or for some other reason? |
5 | The Benefits of Freedom | Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1982, chapters 1-3. ISBN: 9780140432077. Study Questions - Mill says that On Liberty defends "one very simple principle." What is that principle? - How would Mill respond to restrictions on racist hate speech, or pornography, or slander? - How does Mill argue for his "simple principle" on utilitarian grounds? How is the general welfare improved by tolerating religious, philosophical, and moral dissent? What are the costs of such toleration? Why do the benefits outweigh the costs? - Do you think that conduct ought only to be regulated if it is harmful to others? Can you think of cases in which conduct ought to be regulated in the name of the person's own welfare (drugs, seat belts), or because it is repulsive (bestiality), or because it is offensive to others (public sex), or because it is judged to be wrong (suicide, physician-assisted suicide)? - If you are not convinced of Mill's utilitarian rationale for his principle of liberty, can you think of a more convincing rationale? |
6 | Free Exercise and Religious Accommodations | Sherbert vs. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). (PDF) Employment Division vs. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). (PDF) Study Questions - Why are religious convictions important? Are they more important than cultural commitments? - Suppose there are exemptions on religious grounds from general applicable criminal laws. Do such exemptions promise anarchy? - Do exemptions amount to favoritism, or a kind of religious Establishment? - Do you think there ought to be exemptions of the kind explored in Sherbert vs. Verner or Employment Division vs. Smith? Should there be cultural exemptions as well? - Is there a compelling utilitarian case in favor of religious exemptions? Does utilitarianism have a good way to capture the nature of the burden on religious liberty when there are no exemptions? |
II. Libertarianism | ||
7-8 | The Minimal State and Possessive Libertarianism | Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2007, pp. xi-xiv, 3-6, 10-17, 22-35, 48-56, 101-119, 149-164, 167-182, and 232-238. ISBN: 9780465051007. Study Questions - What basic rights does Nozick attribute to individuals, and why does he suppose that we have those rights? - What is a minimal state, and does Nozick have a plausible story of how the state could emerge in a morally permissible way, without violating anyone's rights? - How does the idea of equality before the law fit into Nozick's minimal state? Does the minimal state provide any assurance of a rule of law? - Nozick says that people own themselves (pp. 171-172)? What does that mean? Do you agree? - What does Nozick mean when he says that "liberty upsets patterns?" - Is taxation on wages the moral equivalent of forced labor? Can you see any differences between taxation on earnings from labor and forced labor? Are these differences of moral significance? |
9 | Liberty and Labor Market Regulation | Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). (PDF) Coppage vs. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). (PDF) West Coast Hotel vs. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). (PDF) Study Questions - Why does the Lochner Court think it is illegitimate for the state to regulate labor markets in order to redress inequalities of bargaining power between employers and employees? Are there such inequalities? What are the implications of those inequalities for wages and working conditions? - Is it paternalistic for the legislature to try to correct for inequalities of bargaining power? Do such regulations make workers "wards of the state?" (Is it paternalistic to protect a person from physical assault?) - Are minimum wage laws or workplace health and safety regulations objectionably paternalistic? - Does Nozick's libertarian philosophy echo the reasoning in Lochner and Coppage? |
10 | Liberty and the Rule of Law | Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government. Arlington Heights, IL: H. Davidson, 1982, chapter 11. ISBN: 9780882951256. Hayek, Friedrich. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978, chapter 10. ISBN: 9780226320847. Study Questions - What is the rule of law? Is that idea well-captured by Locke's requirement that there be "settled standing laws," or is something more needed? - Is there, as Hayek asserts, a very intimate connection between the rule of law and liberty? - Locke says that there is to be one rule for rich and poor, for favorite at court and countryman at plough." Does Nozick's minimal state have such uniform rules for all? - Locke says that laws are to be designed for "the good of the people." What does "the good of the people" mean? Is Nozick's minimal state required to meet that condition? |
11-12 | Choice-Based Libertarianism | Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002, introduction, chapters 1, 2, 10, 12, and conclusion. ISBN: 9780226264219. Study Questions - What does Friedman mean by "liberty?" - What is a "right to liberty," and why is there such a right? Are all kinds of liberty of equal importance? Or are some liberties more important than others? - It is sometimes said (as in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution) that government ought to make laws that promote the general welfare. What does that mean? Does Friedman agree? Do laws made for the general welfare ("the good of the people," as Locke put it) violate the basic right to liberty? - Friedman accepts certain kinds of anti-poverty programs and public spending on education as legitimate uses of tax dollars. How does Friedman make the case that an anti-poverty program might promote the general welfare (how does it promote the welfare of people who are not poor)? - Why is it illegitimate for the government to promote what Friedman calls "equality of treatment?" |
13 | Equal Opportunity and Education | San Antonio vs. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), selections. (PDF) Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 85-98. ISBN: 9780226264219. Study Questions - Justice Marshall says that there is a right to an equal start in life. What is an "equal start in life"? Do you agree that there is such a right? Is it fair for some people to have better chances from the outset? If everyone has a chance to do something worthwhile, does it matter if they have equal starts? - Does education help to ensure that everyone has an equal start - or at least an acceptable start - in life? - Does a system of school financing based on local property taxes violate the right to an equal start? - Does a system of equal educational opportunity, financed out of taxes, violate the rights of parents to decide how much they want to spend on education? - Does a program of state-financed, universal education promote the general welfare? How does Friedman make the case that it does? Do you find his argument convincing? |
III. Egalitarian Liberalism | ||
14-15 | Equality and Personal Responsibility | Dworkin, Ronald. "Does Equality Matter?" In Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 1-7. ISBN: 9780674008106. ———. "Justice, Insurance, and Luck." In Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 320-25, and 331-49. ISBN: 9780674008106. Study Questions - How compelling are Dworkin's principles of equal importance and special responsibility? Do you think that government must treat each person's life as being of equal importance? - How does Dworkin's insurance model draw on both of those principles? Where does the idea of special responsibility fit into the insurance scheme? - Are the inequalities sanctioned by Dworkin's insurance model consistent with the idea that it matters equally how well each person's life goes? - What is the case against what Dworkin calls "the severe policy," and is it a convincing argument against current American welfare policy? - What is the "rescue approach," and would it better fit the requirement of equal concern? |
16 | The Problem of Health Insurance | Dworkin, Ronald. "Justice and the High Cost of Health." In Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 307-19. ISBN: 9780674008106. Gladwell, Malcolm. "The Moral-Hazard Myth." New Yorker (August 29, 2005). (5 pages) Emanuel, Ezequiel, and Victor Fuchs. "Getting Covered: Choose a plan everyone can agree on." Boston Review (November/December 2005). Study Questions - Gladwell distinguishes actuarial from social insurance. How is Dworkin's insurance model connected to that distinction? - Why does Dworkin have us choose an insurance system without knowing our health status? What moral idea is expressed in that feature of his hypothetical insurance system? Should health insurance be based on individual situation and risk, or should there be some form of sharing of risks? - Are Emanuel and Fuchs right to think that a commitment to liberty provides strong support for a voucher system? - What is moral hazard? How has the concern about moral hazard shaped health insurance in the United States? Is Gladwell right to think that it is not such a large problem? |
17 | Equality and Affirmative Action | Grutter vs. Bollinger (2003). Study Questions - Are all uses of racial classifications on a par, and equally objectionable? Is it just as objectionable to have an affirmative action that benefits a minority as to have a program that benefits the racial majority? - What is "diversity," and why does the majority in Grutter think it is so important? Do you agree that diversity is of great importance in universities? If so, why? If not, why not? - What does Justice Thomas mean by "racial aesthetics"? - Can you think of other means than affirmative action programs for achieving the educational benefits associated with such programs? - If we agree with Dworkin that each person is of equal importance, can we accept an affirmative action policy, or does such a policy violate the principle of equal importance? - Do you think that affirmative action programs undertaken to promote racial diversity in universities rest on objectionable stereotypes, or reinforce racial divisions? |
18-20 | Reconciling Liberty and Equality | Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999, sections 1-5, 11-14, 17, 20-26, 29, 32-33, 36-37, and 67. ISBN: 9780674000780. Study Questions - Rawls presents the ideal of a fair society in which life chances are not settled by differences in social background or native endowments. How attractive is that ideal? - Are native endowments (natural talents) morally on a par with the contingencies of social background? What does it mean to say that your social background and your native talents are "arbitrary from a moral point of view?" - What principles would people choose in a hypothetical original position, behind a veil of ignorance? - Why should we care about what would be chosen in the original position? - Is Rawls's difference principle fair to people who would be better off under a less egalitarian principle? - What is fair equality of opportunity, and why is it a more compelling idea than formal equality of opportunity? |
21 | Even More Egalitarian? | Cohen, G. A. If You Are An Egalitarian, Why Are You So Rich? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 117-47. ISBN: 9780674006935. Study Questions - Suppose a person with unusual talents is unwilling to make a socially valuable contribution without receiving special incentives for that contribution. Is that unwillingness objectionably selfish, and is the distribution of rewards that results from paying the incentives unjust? - What would a society be like if its ethos (and not only its laws) required members to make contributions without getting special incentives? - Suppose that some racists in a society will make productive contributions that benefit racial minorities only if they (the racists) receive very large incentives. Does justice permit the payment of such incentives? - Are there good reasons to confine the application of the difference principle to the basic structure of society, and not to worry about the choices individuals make within that structure? |
22 | Political Equality and Campaign Finance | Buckley vs. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), selections. (PDF) Study Questions - Do you think that the current system of electoral finance in the United States violates a right of citizens to equal standing in the political system? - Do you agree with the Court majority that limits on political expenditures impose more burdensome restrictions on liberty than limits on political contributions? - Do you think that campaign finance reforms that limited expenditures of money on political campaigns would help to equalize access to the political arena and enhance the voice of less wealthy citizens - i.e., increase the worth of their political liberty? - Suppose the reforms would equalize access: do we then have sufficient reason to support the restrictions on liberty that they imply? Is it important to "level the playing field," and equalize opportunities for effective political influence? |
IV. Four Topics | ||
23 | Justice at Life's Inception | Roe vs. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), selections. (PDF) Thomson, Judith. "Abortion." Boston Review (Summer 1995). Study Questions - The Court majority says that "the right of privacy… is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." What reasons are given in support of this conclusion? - Does the state have a compelling interest in protecting human life from conception? - Can men and woman be social equals in a society with restrictive regulations on terminating pregnancies? - The majority opinion refers to a "wide divergence of thinking" on the question of when life begins. What sort of divergence do they have in mind? What is the relevance of this observation? |
24 | Multiculturalism, Group Rights, and Gender Equality | Okin, Susan. Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 3-24, and 31-34. ISBN: 9780691004327. Study Questions - How important is it for people to have continuing access to the culture in which they have been raised, as opposed to assimilating into the dominant culture of the society? - How could it be fair to provide one group with rights that other groups lack - say, to exempt its members from laws (for example, regulating headgear) that others are required to obey? - Is Okin right that most cultures are patriarchal, and have "as one of their principal aims the control of women by men?" (Are her examples convincing?) - Is Okin right to think that women who belong to a "more patriarchal minority culture" might be better off if that culture became "extinct" or "integrated" into the majority culture? |
25 | Human Rights | Cohen, Joshua. "Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?" The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2004): 190-213. Study Questions - Is the idea of basic human rights a parochial, Western-liberal idea? Is it a problem if it is parochial? - What are the universal human rights? Are those rights confined to basic protections of bodily security? - What is "inclusion," and how does the idea of inclusion connect to human rights? - Do you think there are basic human rights? Why? What are they? |
26 | Rights and Emergencies | Ackerman, Bruce. Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006, chapter 1. ISBN: 9780300112894. Hamdi vs. Rumsfeld. (2004). Opinions by O'Connor and Scalia. Study Questions - Does a threat to the security of large numbers of people justify detention without the usual judicial procedures? Does it justify a suspension of the presumption of innocence? - Does a threat to national independence justify such detention and suspension? - Does it matter to your answers to the first two questions whether the people who are detained are citizens? - Are your answers to these questions guided by utilitarian ideas? If not, what principles are guiding your judgments? |