| WEEK # | TOPICS | LECTURE NOTES |
|---|---|---|
| Section One: Sense and Reference, Names and Descriptions | ||
| 1 | Frege: On Sense and Nominatum | I: Introductory (PDF) II: On Sense and Reference (PDF) |
| 2 | Russell: On Denoting Russell: Descriptions | III: Russell on Denoting (PDF) |
| 3 | Quine: Two Dogmas of Empiricism | IV: Quine's Two Dogmas (PDF) |
| 4-5 | Kripke: Naming and Necessity Putnam: Meaning and Reference | V: Naming and Necessity, Lecture One (PDF) VI: Naming and Necessity, Lecture Two (PDF) VII: Naming and Necessity, Lecture Three (PDF) |
| 6 | Strawson: On Referring Donnellan: Reference and Definite Descriptions Kripke: Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference | VIII: Strawson and Donnellan on Referring and Denoting (PDF) IX: Kripke on Donnellan (PDF) |
| 7 | von Fintel: Would you believe it? The King of France is Back! Yablo: Non-Catastropic Presupposition Failure Perry: The Problem of the Essential Indexical Lewis: Attitudes De Dicto and De Se | X: Presupposition and Empty Names (PDF) XI: Indexicals and De Se Attitudes (PDF) |
| Section Two: Pragmatics | ||
| 8 | Austin: Performative Utterances Grice: Logic and Conversation | XII: Austin on Peformatives (PDF) XIII: Grice: Implicature (PDF) |
| 9 | Lewis: Scorekeeping in a Language Game Langton: Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts Langton and West: Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game | XIV: Lewis: Scorekeeping (PDF) XV: Langton: Unspeakable Acts (PDF) |
| 10 | Lewis: Languages and Language | XVI: Lewis: Language and Languages (PDF) |
| Section Three: Propositional Attitudes | ||
| 11 | Frege: On Sense and Nominatum Davidson: On Saying That | XVII: Propositional Attitudes: Frege and Davidson (PDF) |
| 12 | Kripke: A Puzzle About Belief Salmon: How to Become a Millian Heir | XVIII: Propositional Attitudes: Kripke (PDF) |
| 13 | Crimmins and Perry: The Prince and the Phone Booth Saul: Substitution and Simple Sentences | XIX: Propositional Attitudes: Crimmins and Perry (PDF) |
| Section Four: Truth | ||
| 14 | Frege: On Sense and Nominatum Tarski: The Semantic Conception of Truth, and the Foundations of Semantics Stoljar: The Deflationary Theory of Truth | XX: Truth: The Liar (PDF) XXI: Truth: Minimalism (PDF) |
| Section Five: Rule Following | ||
| 15 | Kripke: On Rules and Private Language Millikan: Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox Holton: Meaning and Rule Following | |