SES # | TOPICS | READINGS |
---|---|---|
1 | Introduction: What is rationality? | |
I. Individual decision theory | ||
2-10 | Preference, ignorance and risk | Resnik, chapters 1-3 |
Probability – subjective and objective | Jeffrey, chapters 1-5 | |
Utility and value | Resnik, chapter 4 Sen, Amartya K. "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory." Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, no. 4 (Summer 1977): 317-344. Reprinted as chapter 4 in: Sen, Amartya K. Choice, Welfare, and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982. ISBN: 9780262192149. | |
Causal decision theory | Lewis, David. "Causal Decision Theory." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59, no. 1 (March 1981): 5-30. For those who want to explore causal decision theory in more depth, see Joyce, especially chapters 2-5. | |
II. Game theory | ||
11-19 | The basic framework | Resnik, chapter 5 Notes on games and models (PDF) |
Nash Equilibrium and other solution concepts | Leyton-Brown and Shoham, chapters 1-5 | |
Game theory and individual decision theory | ||
Coordination games, bargaining and negotiation | Schelling, chapters 4-5 | |
III. Theory of collective choice | ||
20-26 | Defining social value in terms of individual value | Resnik, chapter 6 |
Arrow's theorem, and other impossibility results | Sen, Amartya K. "Rationality and Social Choice." The American Economic Review 85, no. 1 (March 1995): 1-24. Gibbard, Allan. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result." Econometrica 41, no. 4 (July 1973): 587-601. | |
Interpersonal comparisons of utility | Sen, chapter 12 |